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Soup, Justice and Workplace Democracy: 
The Columbia Conserve Company,  
1917-19431
Kenneth D. Colburn, Jr. 
Butler University 
A Commitment to Industrial Democracy 
The Columbia Conserve Company, located at 1735 
Churchman Avenue (at the Belt Railway) on the south side of 
Indianapolis from 1912 to 1953,
2
 employed some 200 workers at
its height. Its business activity was canning tomato, chicken 
noodle, and other varieties of soups, and related items such as 
pork and beans, tomato juice, and catsup. Yet if soup was the 
main product at Columbia, justice in the workplace was its 
primary purpose or sine qua non. Under the leadership of its 
president, William P. Hapgood, and the cooperation of several 
members of his family who owned the company, a 
comprehensive experiment in industrial democracy was 
launched at Columbia that endured for a quarter of a century 
from 1917 to 1943. During this period of time, Columbia received 
national and international recognition for such innovative 
achievements as: a workers' council which managed the 
company; a profit,-sharing and stock trust plan that resulted in 
majority ownership of the company by employees; and various 
workers' benefits such as free comprehensive health coverage, a 
pension plan, and sickness and disability pay. 
Speaking on January 6, 1920, at the Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders, which included employees, Hapgood, made 
reference to the fact that Columbia had just completed the thirty-
second month of its "experiment in employee management." He 
emphasized that the experiment had produced, if nothing else, 
the important achievement of eliminating "ill-will from our 
business." Stating his belief that such antagonism "between 
employees and employers is almost entirely responsible today 
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for our industrial ills"  Hapgood went on to observe that the 
reason such ill-will had been vanquished from Columbia was due 
to the fact that the company was "operating on the best principle 
of life, that is, justice." Proposing that two members of the Board 
of Directors, in a departure from previous practice, be elected 
from the rank and file during elections later that evening, 
Hapgood defended his proposal by reference to this same 
"principle of justice" and the need for "some means by which the 
voice of any individual employee, no matter what his rank, can 
carry through any opposition to the final control of the business. . 
. ." 
Hapgood (1934, p.4) was more articulate about this concept 
of workplace justice in a pamphlet about Columbia's experiment 
written some years later in which he argued that justice has to do 
with a recognition of the right of workers no less than that of 
owners/managers to share equally in the decision-making 
process: 
Just as in political government, the making of laws is a 
human right and not an economic right, so in industrial 
government the control and direction of business should be 
vested in the industrial citizens, the workers. These laws 
should deal with all matters concerning those who work. Not 
only would the workers determine the length of time they 
should work, but they would also determine their incomes, 
their share of the total production, choose their own 
associates and release them, elect their own leaders, 
promote and demote them, and decide upon all the policies 
of the business. 
While the above proposition would have struck many people in 
Hapgood’s time and, indeed, our own period today as a non-
sequitur, nonsensical viewpoint at best—and as an extreme, 
radical and subversive idea at worse—it was not a political or 
revolutionary position, let alone trade union labor politics, in the 
ordinary sense of those words that Hapgood was here 
espousing.  For Hapgood, the idea of industrial democracy was 
simply a logical, self-evident extension and progression of the 
American political culture, rooted in democratic values and 
norms, to the industrial setting.  Justice in the workplace, just as 
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in government and political affairs, meant the elimination of 
autocratic decision-making power, based on the somewhat 
arbitrary privilege of ownership, in favor of democratic decision-
making based on the right of all who are subject to such 
decisions to participate in the process. As Hapgood (1934, p. 6) 
wrote: "In a genuine democracy each one of us must have the 
opportunity to share in making decisions as to the rules under 
which we live together." 
 Yet while justice and democracy in the workplace was 
viewed by Hapgood as good and desirable for its own sake, he 
also emphasized that industrial democracy was vastly superior to 
its counterparts in promoting industrial efficiency.  Industrial 
democracy was superior not only because it reflected American 
ideals of democracy, equality and justice; it was also superior 
because of its great utility in promoting organizational efficiency.  
Hapgood made this point clear in a speech he gave at the 1920 
Annual Meeting of the company when he observed that 
workplace democracy eliminates "enormous waste" and 
"inefficiency." The key to avoiding what Hapgood called the 
"waste of brains," for example, and having "men and women in 
industry using their minds" on their jobs and in their work, is for 
them to have the "correct attitude toward the business." Yet in 
order for such an attitude to exist on the part of the worker it 
cannot be imposed externally from the outside; it must be 
voluntarily accepted and validated by the worker if workers are to 
strive to make themselves into "efficiency expert(s)." Workplace 
democracy was desirable for Hapgood because, rooted in the 
principle of justice and equality for all workers, it encouraged the 
individual worker to perceive his or her self-interest as being 
advanced when the business itself is advanced. The legitimacy 
of decisions arrived at collectively through a democratic process 
was thereby enhanced, increasing the likelihood of worker 
acceptance and compliance with those decisions. As Hapgood 
(1934, p. 34) later wrote: "When a group of people have authority 
to make the rules by which they live and labor, they will nearly 
always abide by those rules." In the language of modem 
sociology (Blumberg, 1968), worker alienation is reduced and 
worker satisfaction, commitment and productivity are enhanced 
through workplace democracy. 
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 Hapgood (1920, p. 12) was critically engaging and decisively 
rejecting Taylorism, the    industrial efficiency model prevalent in 
his era. As Hapgood saw it, Taylor's so-called scientific 
management approach to the workplace was flawed because it 
failed to get at the root cause of worker productivity: 
 
You will recall that a man named Taylor made a great name 
for himself by what he called efficiency work. In my judgment 
he began at the wrong end; he went at it in the wrong 
manner. He tried to get increased efficiency by decreasing 
the amount of movement made by the employees, by putting 
in his watch system, by putting on tests... I do not think any 
efficiency movement will result satisfactorily unless the 
desire comes from the foundation -- from the men and 
women working in the factory. If you WANT to be efficient 
you will be. If you wait for some of us above you to force you 
into efficiency, you will not be.  
 
Taylor approached the problem of worker efficiency externally, 
from the outside, as a technical matter to be solved 
administratively through a specification of the right organization 
of the work task.  Hapgood instead approached the issue of 
worker productivity as a socio-political problem involving 
recourse to such fundamental principles as justice and 
democratic organization.  Just as Hapgood viewed the rank-and-
file worker as a social and political being with more or less the 
same basic needs, if not always the same talents, as the 
"technician" (supervisory, professional staff),
3
  he likewise 
viewed the factory as a socio-political entity and challenge.
4   
 
Hapgood believed he understood better than Taylor what it 
would take to have workers identify with the business and to 
exemplify the same kind of commitment and dedication on the 
job as shown by owners, management, and other "technicians" 
(professionals).   What it would take,  Hapgood (1934, p, 4) 
reasoned, is nothing less and nothing more than applying the 
American solution to government to the sphere of business and 
the establishment of industrial democracy. The solution seemed 
perhaps self-evident or obvious to Hapgood:  "Government of 
the workers, by the workers, for the workers."   
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 It is interesting to note, with regard to worker efficiency at 
Columbia, the conclusions of a contemporary, Paul H. Douglas 
(1922/23, pp. 22-25), who had studied Columbia: “On the 
whole...there seems to be more than substantial justification for 
Mr. Hapgood's belief that the company has fared better with the 
plan than without it...because it has resulted in the workers 
putting their best efforts and intelligence into developing the 
business."  Douglas offered several examples of labor-saving 
devices created by employees: an automatic feed on the catsup-
filling machine conveyor belt, a low-level vat in the kitchen from 
which soup ingredients are pumped into large kettles several feet 
above the floor, and an automatic process for cleaning chicken 
soup cans of fatty drippings after being filled. As further evidence 
of worker efficiency, Douglas (1926, pp. 39-40) cited the "eager 
and inventive spirit" reflected in Columbia's success in canning 
chop suey, which its rivals could not duplicate. He likewise 
reported that hourly output in 1922 was 46% higher than the 
1918 average, and in 1924 it was 78% above that of 1918. 
 It is worth noting that Hapgood’s emphasis on the principle 
of workplace democracy sharply differentiated him from the 
mainstream of labor no less than that of the business world of his 
time. Two examples may be cited to illustrate this point.  First, 
Samuel Gompers (1920, p. 286), to alleviate the apprehension of 
business leaders in his advocacy of collective bargaining, 
opposed precisely the kind of worker control and participation put 
forward by Hapgood: 
“Collective bargaining does not imply that wage earners shall 
assume control of industry, or responsibility for financial 
management... there is no belief held in the trade unions that its 
members shall control the plant or usurp the rights of owners.”   
 Second, the American Federation of Labor in 1925 fully 
endorsed Taylor's system of scientific management. In so doing 
it embraced the basic philosophical tenets of Taylorism, which 
involved viewing the issue of industrial efficiency according to a 
rather narrowly defined technical perspective that excluded a 
concern with such fundamental humanistic issues as justice and 
democratic decision-making for workers in the workplace.  
Consistent with this philosophy, in fact, the A.F.L. rejected an 
application by Columbia for a union charter, as reflected in the 
following letter of November 12, 1932, from William Green, 
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President, American Federation of Labor, to the Columbia 
Conserve Company: “the conclusion reached by the Executive 
Council was adverse to the proposal, as...the relations between 
the Company and its employees are not the relations of 
employer with its employees, paid a stipulated wage per day or 
per week, but the employees are stockholders in the Company 
and are not paid on a wage working basis.”
5 
 The American labor 
and trade union leadership, ironically yet perhaps not 
surprisingly, found itself in the position of  rejecting one of the 
more progressive strands of the American nascent labor 
movement of the early twentieth century.  Organized labor 
apparently  had no more stomach for democracy in the 
workplace than did the mainstream business community.   
 Neither fish nor fowl, the Columbia Conserve Company, with 
its commitment to social justice in the workplace, did not fit into 
either the trade unionism or the capitalism of its day.  The 
message was clear: Columbia  along with the precious few other 
businesses organized around the principle of democracy, would 
be isolated from both traditional business and labor and would 
have to sink or swim, make it or perish, pretty much on its own.   
 
The Early Years: 1917-1924 
 While Columbia had been in business for several years prior 
to the beginning of its experiment in workplace democracy, it 
was not until 1917 that it had produced a significant profit. Due in 
part to this financial success, the pro-worker sentiment of the 
firm's major owners, William P. Hapgood's mother and brothers, 
and the urging of Columbia's president, William P. Hapgood 
himself, Columbia took several important steps toward 
establishing democracy at the business in the period 1917-1924. 
These included: (1) a workers' council which was responsible for 
managing the business, (2) a profit-sharing plan for workers, and 
(3) employee representation on the Board of Directors.  
 Workers' control and involvement in managing Columbia 
began in 1917 with the creation of a leadership Committee 
consisting of ten persons, seven of whom were elected factory 
representatives and three others who were appointed by the 
owners.
6
  The Committee had all managerial authority, subject 
only to the Board of Directors,
7
 over policy and operations for the 
company. During the first year only, William P. Hapgood had the 
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right of veto over any of the Committee's decisions and, in later 
years, this veto power was extended to the Board of Directors.
8
 
In theory this Committee, and later the Council which replaced it, 
decided all matters by a simple majority vote, but in practice this 
body often sought to arrive at a consensus on matters it dealt 
with.
9
 
 Hapgood (1934, pp. 4-5) observed that the first problem in 
moving toward workers' control of the business, namely, gaining 
the trust of workers and overcoming their distrust of owners, was 
an easier one to solve than the second problem of overcoming 
workers' lack of confidence in themselves. Whether or not one 
accepts Hapgood's view of the relative ease of solving the first 
over the second problem, it seems clear that the Committee did 
not waste much time -- nor appear to have lacked enough 
confidence -- to test both the limits of its decision-making power 
and the extent of Hapgood and his family's commitment to 
sharing such authority with workers. Early on in its tenure in 
1917, the Committee tackled two important issues: the schedule 
of working hours and the placement of rank-and-file workers on 
salary. 
 A work week of fifty-five hours during most of the year, 
except during the peak packing season from late August through 
October when longer hours were required, was the norm at 
Columbia.   At the end of the second month of its operation, the 
Committee sought to change this norm by proposing a reduction 
from 55 to 50 hours per week. Perhaps not coincidentally, 
members of the Committee first brought this matter up for 
discussion during Hapgood's absence, when it was endorsed by 
those present. Although William P. recommended upon his 
return, and the Committee agreed, that the implementation of the 
decision be delayed for a month due to an increase of sales, the 
new fifty-hour week was enacted after this short delay. This was 
the norm at Columbia until 1921, when Council, after a brief trial 
period, reduced it to a forty-four hour work week (an eight-hour 
day, five days a week and a half-day on Saturday), excluding, 
again, the peak canning period from August through October 
which required a greater hours.
10
  Shortly thereafter, in April of 
1922, the working schedule was again changed to a five-day 
week and nine-hour day during the non-peak period.
11
  The latter 
was reaffirmed in November 1923 with the added provision that 
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workers will be paid for a full ten hour day although they work 
only nine hours. 
12
 
 It is worth noting that the canning industry was no different 
during Columbia's time than it is today, namely, a highly 
seasonal industry in which work is concentrated during the 
harvest period when products such as tomatoes must be packed 
within a very short time. It is certainly one of Columbia's most 
remarkable achievements that it was possible for the Committee 
in 1917 to discuss and eventually approve a policy of year-round 
employment for most employees. This was accomplished 
through placing the majority of workers, except for a small group 
of surplus temporary wage workers employed only during the 
canning season, on annual salary. As Hapgood (1934, p. 21) 
observed:  "We finally agreed that our first responsibility 
thereafter should be regularity of employment... Accordingly we 
placed most of the wage force on a salary basis with the 
understanding that they would be retained by the year..." 
 The Committee was replaced in 1918 by a dual governing 
structure involving a Council, which assumed the Committee's 
former decision-making authority, and a Factory Committee, 
which became advisory to Council until 1920, when it was 
disbanded due to apparent lack of interest.
13 
 Council 
membership was initially restricted to supervisory staff such as 
department heads, while the new Factory Committee was an 
elected body of "rank-and-file" (i.e., non-supervisory) workers. 
Within the space of a few years, however, criteria for 
membership on Council was broadened sufficiently to be open to 
any regular, full-time employee who was willing and able to 
attend its bi-weekly meetings (Hapgood, 1934, p. 15; Douglas, 
1922-23 & 1926). In June, 1921, Council decreed that any 
salaried employee could become a member by attending eight 
consecutive meetings; likewise any Council member who missed 
two consecutive meetings without reason could be dropped.
l4
  
Even this restriction was removed in 1924 so that any employee, 
including wage workers, could attend and vote in Council 
meetings without prior attendance (except on an issue that the 
Council determined could be voted upon only by its senior 
members, a situation that occurred only once in 1925). 
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 A very generous profit-sharing plan by any standard then or 
now was introduced at Columbia in 1917-18 in which all profits, 
after expenses and taxes, were to be divided equally between 
stockholders and employees.  For this purpose an annual salary 
of $1000 was made the equivalent of $1000 worth of stock and 
both the worker and stockholder received the same dividend 
based on their $1000 "share." Profit-sharing was limited in 1917-
18 to salaried employers and dividends were often paid in the 
form of stock which Columbia would buy back at par value from 
employees for cash. The dividend paid to stockholders and 
employees alike was 10% in 1917, 12% in 1918, 6% in 1919, 
12.5% in 1922, and 10% in 1924. Columbia made no profit in 
1920, 1921, and 1923, due to depressed business conditions.  
Workers' share of total profits amounted to 10.8% in 1917 and 
$11,800 was distributed to employees, workers' share was 8.7% 
of all profits in 1918 and $5,900 was allocated, workers' share 
was 8.8% of all profits in 1919 and $5,000 was distributed to 
workers, workers' share of profits was 14.6% in 1922 and $6,880 
was distributed to employees, and workers' share of profits was 
17.9% in 1924 and $12,600 was distributed to employees. 
 Beginning in 1920, at Hapgood's suggestion, two of 
Columbia's five-person Board of Directors were to be from the 
rank-and-file, non-supervisory class of employees.
15
  Hapgood 
hoped that greater representation of the rank-and-file worker on 
the Board would alleviate any lingering concerns or doubts on 
the part of the rank-and-file that the interests of the majority of 
workers were not being safeguarded. Over time, as the 
membership and authority of  Council increased, the Board of 
Directors became less and less prominent in company affairs to 
the point where it became a virtual rubber stamp for the 
decisions of Council.
16 
 Council dealt with a wide range of topics, 
including manufacturing decisions and marketing strategies, an 
employee classification system for salary and a determination of 
each employee's salary, including the salaries of Board 
members and company officers, as well as the range of benefits 
they should receive. 
 Placing Columbia’s workplace democracy in perspective,  a 
few facts concerning profit sharing and employee management 
in the industrial era of its time speak volumes.  As of 1923, 
businesses with 250 or less employees represented 96.5% of all 
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manufacturing concerns and only 3.8% and 2.5%, respectively, 
of small plants offered profit-sharing plans and works councils.
17
 
In 1920, the National Industrial Conference Board found only 97 
profit-sharing plans in existence in the country.
18
  In 1919, there 
were but 18 works councils among industrial establishments 
(seven in the food industry) of less than 200 employees, and 
even fewer -- 12 -- by 1924.
19
  And in no case did any of these 
works councils actually have managerial authority and 
responsibility comparable to that of Columbia's Council.
20
  As 
one contemporary student of Columbia, Paul H. Douglas 
(1922/23, p. 6), observed:  “Unlike every other shop committee 
that I know of, no subject was excluded from their consideration, 
for they were empowered to deal with any question that related 
to the factory as a whole, whether it had to do with adjusting 
‘wages, hours and conditions of labor’ or general factory 
problems of management." 
 
The Golden Years: 1925-1930 
 By the year 1925, Columbia had achieved considerable 
success in establishing workplace democracy through its 
employee management and profit-sharing plans.  Norman 
Hapgood, William's brother and also a major stock-holder in the 
company, stated at the Annual Meeting of January 18, 1924, that 
Council "has really learned its job," in reference to its ability to 
successfully manage the company during a period when William 
P. Hapgood was ill and unable to work.   Columbia had put into 
place by 1925 a number of progressive employee benefits and 
working conditions. In addition to placing workers on regular, full-
time employment throughout the year and shortening working 
hours, workers also received a month-long vacation with pay, full 
pay due to sickness and injury, and a fully paid maternity leave 
of six weeks for both wage and salary workers -- the latter 
representing Columbia's innovative leadership in many areas 
taken for granted by labor today.
21
  Yet even more was to be 
accomplished at Columbia in the next few years that would 
further solidify its framework of workplace democracy and 
significantly add to employee benefits and working conditions. 
 Perhaps the single most important event during this period 
was the offering and acceptance of a contract between 
stockholders (primarily the Hapgood family) and salaried 
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employers which provided for the eventual ownership of 
Columbia by its employees. Professor Douglas (1922/23, p. 32) 
of the University of Chicago, who had visited and studied 
Columbia in its early years, wrote: "It is conceivable that the 
absentee owners of the company may come to disapprove of the 
experiment and call a halt upon it." He concluded that it would be 
"desirable for the workmen gradually to take up the stock of the 
owners and thus come to own as well as to manage the 
industry." Accordingly, the Hapgood family began in late 1924 to 
discuss with Council a plan whereby employees could acquire 
ownership and control of Columbia.  Professor Douglas in fact 
visited Council in March 1925 to discuss the Hapgood proposal 
with employees and, after revision and re-submission of the plan, 
a long discussion was held on December 18, 1925, in which 
Council voted 57 to 1, with one abstention, to accept it. 
 The new contract between Columbia's stockholders and its 
salaried workers assigned net profits to workers after (1) 
dividends of 10% were paid on common stock and salaries, 
22
 (2) 
reserves were set aside for taxes and depreciation, and (3) 10% 
of the remaining amount was set aside as a pension fund under 
control of Council.  Net profits were to be used by workers to 
purchase common stock at $150 per share until all common 
stock had been bought.  Not unlike the year 1917, when 
workplace democracy began at Columbia, 1925 was a very 
profitable year which resulted in some $50,000 becoming 
available to salaried employers for the purchase of common 
stock. Council decided on January 5, 1926 to establish a trust 
fund for workers overseen by three trustees elected by Council 
who would have legal title to the common stock acquired by this 
contract and the right to vote at the annual stockholders' 
meetings "subject to the advice and consent of Council." The 
final contract was signed on January 15, 1926, by 93 salaried 
workers. Due to profitable years from 1925 through 1930, with 
the exception of 1927, workers at Columbia acquired 51% of 
common stock in July, 1930, and legal control of the company, a 
fact that was widely reported in most major newspapers 
throughout the nation, including the New York Times, 
Indianapolis Star and Indianapolis Times. Within a few more 
years, workers collectively owned 63% of common stock. 
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Working conditions; including wages and other employee 
benefits, improved substantially during this period. When older 
workers were no longer able to work, they were provided with 
pensions.
23
  Group life insurance was also made available to
employees with the company paying 25% of the cost. A health 
committee was established in 1926 and successfully 
recommended to Council in 1927 that a physician be engaged to 
make daily visits to the plant for consulting about employees' 
illness and accidents. This program was expanded in 1929 to 
include regular examinations for employees and other medical 
intervention, including hospital care, at company expense. There 
were physicians on staff along with a medical advisor, 
24
Columbia also took financial responsibility for the health care of 
dependents, at first by establishing a fund which would loan 
funds to employees to repay on the basis of ability to do so, and, 
then, later by underwriting the cost for all dependents.
25
  Dental
and eye care for employees, including the cost for one pair of 
glasses, was included as part of the health beneft.
26
 And,
indicative of their new positions as employee-owners, Council 
decided in July, 1929, that salaried employees would no longer 
be required to punch in on the time-clock. 
Education was another central concern to Columbia that was 
demonstrated in several ways.  It had become customary from 
the outset for outside speakers to be invited to speak at Council 
meetings on topics of general interest, especially those involving 
social and labor issues.
27
 An arrangement between Antioch
College, Ohio, and Columbia existed in which male and female 
students were hired for alternate, rotating six-week internships at 
the company.
28
 Students from such universities and colleges as
Ames Agricultural College, Iowa, Indiana Central University (now 
The University of Indianapolis), Butler University, and Earlham 
College, Richmond, were employed so that they might learn 
about industrial democracy and as a means of potential 
recruitment of college graduates to Columbia.
29
  Columbia
workers were given a chance to further their education through 
scholarships for summer school at the University of Wisconsin 
and other schools.
30
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Columbia's 
commitment to education is exemplified by its extraordinary 
efforts to "start an educational department to deal with the social 
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sciences, beginning with economics and the history of the labor 
movement." (Hapgood, 1934, p. 38)   Council made the decision 
to employ an instructor in "the history of economics and social 
philosophy" in July 1925. 
31
  Several months later on November 
13, 1925,  on the recommendation of  William P. Hapgood, 
Council made an offer to Jack Evans, a teacher who had 
experience instructing miners in Wales.  Although initially 
reluctant to accept the offer,
32
 Jack Evans did finally agree to join 
Columbia in November 1926,
33
 assuming at first the roles of 
librarian and chair of the library committee.
34 
 Classes were 
begun in late February, 1927,  and demand was sufficient by 
April of that year to require doubling the number of classes to 
alleviate overcrowding.
35
 Another teacher and a graduate of Yale 
University, J. Levering Evans, was offered a position at Columbia 
in April, 1927, due to the apparent demand for classes.
36
  This 
educational program was short-lived,  however, due apparently 
to a lack of continuing interest on the part of workers. Hapgood 
(1934, p. 39) wrote: “The classes were held outside of working 
hours and most of the workers were too tired to apply 
themselves to a new undertaking following the regular day's 
work. It was difficult, also, for them to understand how the 
information they were acquiring in classes would assist them in 
business.”  The program was revived again in 1930 with 14 
classes per week in such areas as Industrial History, Elementary 
Economics, and Labor Problems, with a total enrollment of 83 
employee-owners. However, this program was once again 
abandoned with the advent of the Depression and the company 
conflict of 1932-1933. 
 Personnel issues, especially salary matters, appear to have 
dominated much of Council's attention throughout the mid to late 
1920s. Prior to 1925 there were three or four categories for 
classifying most employees with the exception of supervisory 
staff such as foremen and forewomen, department heads, and 
other administrative personnel and excluding most salesmen 
who were on a commission basis. Women were paid on a 
parallel but lower scale. For example, the salary scale for males 
and females per week over the seven year period 1917 to 1924 
was as follows (minimum, class c, to maximum, class a, rates): 
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On January 23, 1925, Council abolished the foregoing 
classification system for salaries and appointed a committee to 
formulate a new plan. The main reason for dissatisfaction with 
the old system was that there were too few categories for 
satisfactory placement of all workers. Accordingly, the committee 
reported back on New Year's Eve day with a new salary scale of 
ten levels beginning with a minimum of $18 for level 1, $24 for 
level 5, $30 for level 9, and any amount over $30 determined by 
Council for level 10. The scale was gender neutral or the same 
for men and women, however, most women at Columbia tended 
to occupy positions at the lower end of the scale except for those 
few in an office or supervisory capacity. The salary scale as well 
as the philosophy underlying it was changed again on March 24, 
1926, when it accepted a committee's proposal "to pay married 
man in proportion to his financial needs." Council decided to 
establish $24 per week as the minimum salary for a married man 
(versus $19 minimum for a single male), with the further 
stipulation that every man who currently received less than $30 
would receive an additional $1 per week for each child under 16 
years old, up to three children, and up to a maximum of $30. 
Payment over $30 per week was to be based only on merit and 
not on the basis of financial need. 
 The issue of gender equality under this new system of 
payment based on need was brought to Council on March 25, 
1927, when it considered and voted down several motions 
concerning female heads of households being placed at the 
same minimum salary of $24 as men were then receiving. 
          YEAR  MALES FEMALES 
 
 1917  $14 - 17 $09 - 11 
 1918  $17 - 19 $12 - 14 
 1919  $21 - 24 $13 - 15 
 1920  $22 - 26 $14 - 17 
 1921  $22 - 26 $14 - 17 
 1922  $22 - 26 $14 - 17 
 1923  $24 - 27 $16 - 18 
 1924  $24 - 27 $16 - 18 
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However, as was the Columbia way, it was decided to defer this 
topic to a later meeting after a committee had time to study the 
matter and make a recommendation to Council.
37
  It was agreed 
shortly thereafter that the marriage differential and child 
allowance would be paid to any woman who was the head of the 
household and the chief economic provider for her family, 
demonstrating Columbia's commitment to gender equality and 
justice. On this score, Columbia displayed a real commitment to 
gender equality in the workplace which was many years ahead 
of general American business practice.
38   
 
Apparently anxious about the newly revised salary schedule 
and those placed within it, Council appointed on May 20, 1927, a 
brand new committee, the Salary Key Committee, to examine 
the salaries of all employees and to suggest if necessary another 
new salary key. The committee reported back to Council in July, 
1927 with the new salary key, which included not only familiar 
rating criteria such as work efficiency but also less familiar 
criteria such as understanding of Columbia' s co-operative goal. 
The new salary guidelines were approved and the Salary Key 
Committee spent the next half a year determining employees' 
salaries on this basis. 
 Several important policies in relation to salary issues were 
decided by Council in December, 1927. These included on 
December 3rd and 5th a unanimous reaffirmation of the belief in 
a minimum salary (then $19 per week), approval of a $9.50 per 
week marriage differential, and approval of a $1 per week 
increase in the child allowance to $2 per child per week.
39
 On 
December 9th and 10th, Council decided that single men and 
women would begin at the same minimum salary, the marriage 
differential and child allowance would be paid to employed 
widows and widowers to enable them to care for their children, 
the single minimum salary would be raised to $20.50, and that 
the marriage differential would be an additional 50% of the single 
minimum salary (or $10.25).   
 As if all this were not enough, salary issues continued to be 
discussed in Council throughout 1928 and 1929. Hapgood 
(1934, pp. 28-29) summarizes this process and the final 
outcome. 
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At one time we spent over a year in an attempt to find a 
scale by means of which we could more clearly determine 
the contribution of the employee to the business, and thus 
estimate more exactly what his income should be. Finally a 
committee of the most able men and women in the plant was 
chosen to give this problem serious study.... In the early part 
of 1929, after the committee had reported its complete 
inability to find a satisfactory method of payment based on 
comparative merits, Council reviewed its whole experience 
with the problem and agreed unanimously that payment of 
salaries on the basis of need should henceforth be our 
method. 
 
To pay wages and salary on the basis of need rather than merit 
represented a radical departure from the customary practice 
employee compensation.  Throughout April and May, 1929, 
every employee's rating and salary was reviewed by Council 
according to two different sets of criteria: (1) efficiency and (2) 
need. Nearly every employee, except for a few technicians, 
received higher pay when being rated under the new system for 
payment according to needs. Council decided to pay on the 
basis of need except for those persons who wished to be paid 
strictly on the basis of efficiency because their salary would be 
higher this way. In addition a needs committee was charged with 
the responsibility of reviewing requests for special needs 
(Hapgood, 1934 p. 30).  With the adoption of this salary plan 
based on need, Columbia clearly departed from the mainstream 
views of both big business and organized labor with regard to 
employee wages and compensation. 
 
The Depression Years and Early Strains, 1931-1932 
 The financial impact of the Depression was initially very mild 
at Columbia. In 1930, Columbia was by far the leading national 
packer of private label soups for over 160 private labels, and 
these brands were distributed through 500 jobbers and over 250 
distributors nationwide in most states and major cities/towns. Its 
business outlook in 1930 was excellent and, in the absence of 
clear economic signs of a severe and significant disruption of the 
business cycle just around the corner, Columbia entered the 
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1930s highly optimistic and quite unprepared for the economic 
decline that was to come. 
The first indication that the financial situation of the company 
was more serious than anyone realized was the financial report 
of March 20, 1931, and news of a sharp decline of 30% in sales. 
Still, at this point in time, William P. Hapgood believed that the 
sales problem was primarily a marketing and distribution one 
involving jobbers and, therefore, a problem capable of 
remediation with greater sales effort on the part of the company. 
It became increasingly apparent, however, throughout the late 
spring and summer of 1931 that the general economic situation 
was becoming steadily worse and would likely remain so for 
some time. Canned soup, after all, had been bought by 
consumers for convenience and as a time-saver, and as the 
depression widened and deepened and more people lost their 
jobs and incomes declined, soup became a luxury that many 
could no longer afford. 
In April and May, 1931, Council debated whether or not to 
release wage workers. After hearing the recommendation of a 
committee, and after much emotional debate and soul-searching, 
Council reluctantly voted on May 15, 1931 to let wage workers 
go. In retrospect, this lay-off would signal the beginning of 
difficult financial times at Columbia and would be the first of 
many cutbacks that would have to be imposed over the next 
months. Two weeks later, on May 29, 1931, Council discussed a 
proposal put forward by William P. Hapgood for a 50% salary 
reduction for all salaried employers in order to cope with the 
growing deficit. In part this suggestion resulted from Columbia's 
inability to repay, in view of the seriously depressed economy 
and resulting slow sales, a twelve month loan to Fletcher 
American National Bank of Indianapolis. Although another loan 
was secured from the Central Trust Fund of Chicago at a lower 
interest rate to meet the latter obligation, operating expenses 
were quickly outpacing slow soup sales and Council agreed on 
June 1, 1931, to the temporary salary reduction of 50% of the 
1930 salary rate for as long as financial conditions made it 
necessary. 
All cost cutting measures at Columbia were predicated on 
the co-operative principle that salary reduction was preferable to 
the discharge of any employee due to economic reasons. 
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Although some employees did resign or were fired for cause 
during this period, Columbia laid off no salaried employees due 
to financial exigency at this or any other point in its history, an 
exceptional performance for such a business at the time. By the 
beginning of September, 1931, salaries were raised back to 70% 
of the 1930 rate; by the beginning of October, 1931, to 80%.  
However, due to the worsening economic situation, another 
salary reduction in the spring of 1932 of about 20% was 
proposed, and on April 22, 1932, Council agreed after much 
discussion to reduce salaries to about 60% of their 1930 rate.  
 There was disagreement about whether health benefits and 
other aspects of the "social program," as it was referred to, 
should be sacrificed prior to a salary reduction, but a majority of 
workers favored retaining the benefits and, instead, reducing 
salary for all. As the economic situation continued to deteriorate, 
several additional cost-cutting measures were debated and 
eventually instituted within the next few months.
40
  More drastic 
measures were voted by Council in May, 1932, including a 
further 33% reduction in payroll (every third paycheck was 
skipped) due to a lack of operating funds, elimination of free 
health care for dependents, and elimination of free meals at the 
plant during overtime. 
 Council had approved the first proposal for a 50% salary 
reduction on June 1, 1931 as a deferred payment, that is, with 
the assumption that the lost income would eventually be repaid. 
However, one year later, Columbia was still paying deferred 
salaries, when it was able to pay salaries at all, and in June, 
1932, the company bookkeeper, Howard Herner, suggested that 
deferred salaries be removed from the company books and an 
unofficial list be kept of the income due each worker. Council 
passed this recommendation as a motion, but it was informed 
shortly thereafter by its CPA that this was an illegal practice and 
that Council should have canceled unpaid salaries in full, 
Council, therefore, reluctantly agreed on July 1, 1932, to officially 
cancel all deferred salaries, but in so doing it was informally 
understood that these would be paid back when the company 
was financially well.   
 After the cancellation of deferred salaries from the 
company's books, Columbia's operating loss was $70,000 as of 
July 15, 1932. With the use of available funds in the surplus 
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account, this deficit was reduced to about $40,000. Without the 
cancellation of deferred salaries from the books, the company 
would have been closer to $110,000 in the red, seriously 
impairing its financial independence and perhaps even risking 
receivership.
41
   Nevertheless, the formal cancellation of deferred
salaries was controversial and, for the first time perhaps at 
Columbia, a deep and lingering feeling of distrust and suspicion, 
if not outright hostility, appears to have existed on the part of 
more than a few workers toward the company and its leaders. 
The existence of such a divisive mood is reflected by the fact 
that the motion to officially cancel all deferred salaries was 
challenged, although unsuccessfully, by some employees just 
one week after Council had approved it. 
One factor underlying this controversy and moral problem 
was the unresolved, structural tension—even contradiction—
implicit in the dual role of worker-owner at Columbia. Workers 
were being asked to recognize that, as part-owners, they could 
not receive income for wages when the company was operating 
at a loss. At the same time, many workers saw themselves as 
employees who were entitled to a wage as long as they put in 
hours for the company, regardless of its financial situation. 
Workers were owners collectively under the trust arrangement, 
and majority ownership of the company enabled them to 
collectively administer and manage the firm; but individually the 
worker did not share directly in the financial aspect of ownership 
since he or she had no individual access to the wealth 
represented by the common stock as, for example, when or if he 
or she left the company. This tenuous, abstract character of 
worker ownership would play some role in fostering social unrest 
at Columbia in the months ahead. 
Personal and Factional Conflict, 1931-1933 
A second factor contributing to the morale problem at 
Columbia stemmed from major unresolved differences within the 
sales department regarding personalities, management styles, 
sales strategies, and opinions of how best to respond to the 
economic crisis. All of these various differences and tensions 
appear to have crystallized around William P. Hapgood' s 
introduction and promotion of the Columbia label, which many in 
the sales department opposed. 
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 Partly to offset the declining sales of private label soups, 
which were then having difficulty competing with Campbell's, 
William P. Hapgood, head of the sales department (as well as 
general manager and president), proposed a new marketing 
strategy to promote the sale of its soup. Columbia's story of 
workplace democracy, which had by this time received a good 
deal of local and national publicity, was to serve as the focus of a 
national advertising campaign.
42 
Slogans included lines such as 
"made by cooks who care," and "the business without a boss," 
which was taken from an article in the Indianapolis Times of 
February 13, 1930, by its editor, Boyd Gurley. This article was 
reproduced in pamphlet form and provided to wholesalers and 
others for distribution to consumers. Advertisements were placed 
in local Indianapolis papers, the Times and Star, and national 
media such as the Christian Science Monitor. Even labels on 
cans told about the Columbia experiment: 
 
No wonder we make such fine soups, catsup, tomato juice 
and other products. We the workers own the business. We 
are proud we have succeeded, and succeeded because we 
have done better work because we cared. Not one of us has 
been discharged on account of hard times. For us there is no 
unemployment. There are 52 pay envelopes a year, old age 
pensions, expert care in sickness and in health, three weeks 
vacation with full pay. Why should we not make good 
products? If you think this plan should spread, and if you find 
this product is better because it is made by cooks who care, 
please tell your friends about it. 
 
 As another example, a twelve segment weekly serial, 
"Where Labor Recaps Its Full Reward," was run primarily in 
labor, co-operative and other newspapers. Articles written about 
Columbia by both those inside and outside the company, for 
example, "Where Workers Rule," by Powers Hapgood, which 
appeared in The Railway Clerk, also helped to publicize 
workplace democracy at Columbia around the nation. Finally, a 
speakers committee composed mainly of sales staff, including 
William P. and his son, Powers, was organized to provide 
speakers for church and college groups, labor unions, and 
business groups. 
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 At first William P. 's publicity plan called for placing a 
reference to Columbia and its unique workplace democracy on 
the labels of private distributors for which Columbia packed. 
However, due to the reluctance of some private labels (including 
those in Indianapolis) to go along with this idea, Hapgood 
advocated selling soup directly under a brand new Columbia 
Conserve Company label. Such a step which would place it more 
or less directly in competition with Campbell's Soups. Hapgood 
was encouraged in this plan by a combination of (1) small but 
significant pockets of local markets throughout the United States 
where Campbell's soups had not penetrated and (2) strong 
grass-roots support among socially concerned and Church-
based groups in New England (New Haven), the Midwest (for 
example, Michigan), the West coast, and elsewhere. Such 
groups of consumers were very attracted to the story of 
Columbia' s commitment to workplace democracy and appeared 
to be willing to help the company promote its soup.
43
 
 Canning for private labels had pretty much enabled 
Columbia up to this time to avoid high advertising costs, but the 
private label business was now clearly distressed and its future 
outlook uncertain. Hapgood' s new marketing program was 
designed to produce badly needed sales of Columbia soup, but it 
did have some risks. It was unclear whether the Columbia label 
could stimulate sufficient soup sales and, during a period of 
financial hardship and cutbacks for workers, it would be using 
scarce resources. Advertising costs had been very modest up to 
the late 1920s, while publicity and advertising costs for 1931 
alone exceeded $40,000. This was roughly the same amount of 
deferred salaries which Council, as we have seen, officially 
canceled in July 1932. Some of the sales staff also argued that 
the Columbia label took business away from its own private label 
business which, if true, would be self-defeating. 
 Yet, at the same time, doing nothing was likewise not without 
risks of its own. The bottom line was that the company could not 
survive very long without increased soup sales. Could the new 
sales program succeed and, if so, could it succeed before the 
company went bankrupt? Or would it merely hasten bankruptcy? 
And, perhaps most importantly of all, could the controversy and 
differences of opinion relating to this and related matters be 
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satisfactorily resolved within the framework of workplace 
democracy at Columbia?  
 Disagreement and contention within the sales department 
over the Columbia label resulted, at the end of 1931, in the 
division of the sales department into two departments, one 
dealing primarily with the new Columbia label business in New 
England, the Midwest, the West, and the Chicago area, and the 
other with the remaining private label business.
44
  This 
arrangement lasted only a few months, however, since it had 
become apparent that the structure was inefficient and all sales 
staff, with their consent, were again placed under the direction of 
Hapgood. 
 The business picture presented at the Annual Meeting of 
July 15, 1932, was grim and provided little basis for future 
optimism. Sales were down about one-third over the previous 
year, and there was a net operating loss for the year of $70,000. 
The bad news precipitated a tense atmosphere involving various 
charges concerning who and what was to blame for the current 
financial crisis. The Columbia label and Hapgood' s autocratic 
style of management was cited by some as the leading cause, 
while others pointed to the factionalism introduced at the plant by 
the newer "college group" that was trying to impose "socialism" 
on the others. Still others cited deferred salaries as the reason. 
In spite of the foregoing expression of discontent by some, the 
same persons who had served the previous year were re-elected 
to the Board of Directors shortly later that evening at the 
stockholder's meeting.
45 
 Relations between Hapgood and many in the sales 
department continued to deteriorate throughout the next several 
months, as evidenced by the confrontational and personal nature 
of the final Council meeting of the year. At the December, 29, 
1932, meeting, Hapgood was attacked and rebuked by several 
members of his sales staff.  John Brophy, a former trade unionist 
and relative newcomer, criticized Hapgood for his autocratic style 
of management. He also criticized Hapgood for certain aspects 
of the Columbia label project, especially the emphasis on the 
social program at Columbia to market soup. He suggested that 
"the foundation on which the publicity was based was based has 
been gradually destroyed... (and that) many of the elements 
which made the story valuable do not now exist."  While 
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admitting that selling soup under the Columbia label was a 
correct decision, since it was selling quite well, many of the sales 
staff felt that too much money was being spent on an 
"advertising orgy." They also believed that the marketing 
program should emphasize price and quality over Columbia's 
workplace democracy, which they claimed was no longer in 
existence due partly to Hapgood's autocracy.  Hapgood 
defended the decision to sell soup under the Columbia label. He 
pointed out that the publicity campaign, involving public speaking 
and advertising in selected papers, was actually very modest in 
cost, considering the results. Hapgood defended the promotion 
of Columbia label soup with an emphasis on the company's 
workplace democracy and resulting social programs. Finally, he 
suggested that for the staff to try to tell the manager or other 
"technician" (professional) how to lead a department was taking 
democracy to an "absurdity and ruin."
46 
 An attempt was made at the first Council meeting of the new 
year, January 4, 1933, to restore at least some of the civility 
which had recently been lost by adopting a more formal 
requirement that persons stand when addressing the group.  
However, the rupture in social relations and community was far 
deeper than could be restored by such simple measures. This 
was clearly evident in a speech given by John Brophy directed 
against William P., in which he stated that 95 per cent of 
Columbia label sales would have been gained anyway without 
the assistance of the publicity program. He further accused 
William P. Hapgood of having an "obsession with show and 
front," and he suggested that all of the emphasis on publicity was 
"a form of self-intoxication" for Hapgood.  Following Brophy' s 
speech, another salesman, Frank Eustis, made the motion that 
no money be spent on publicity for the first six months of the 
year. Hapgood responded by explaining that they were in the 
middle of a promotional campaign in Michigan that relied upon 
public speaking and other publicity to sell soup, and that he had 
already made commitments to people which he felt obligated to 
honor.  Eustis further stated that some of the speakers who were 
promoting soup were misrepresenting the program by the 
omission of important facts.  He then digressed to a criticism of 
stockholders' contracts, dividends' problems, the relation 
between Columbia and the Hapgood Farm, and the bookkeeping 
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that was being done for the Hapgoods by the company. After 
much acrimonious debate and discussion, Eustis' s motion was 
passed by Council.
47
Two days later, on January 6, 1933, another Council 
meeting was held in which Hapgood stated that he would resign 
within two weeks if he was not allowed full authority to run his 
department. Brophy immediately challenged Hapgood's demand 
as "undemocratic" and he claimed that Hapgood was asking for 
a "dictatorship." At this point William P. Hapgood withdrew from 
the meeting, leaving behind his brother, Norman, to represent his 
point of view. After some discussion, in which some of the sales 
staff argued in favor of accepting Hapgood' s resignation, the 
motion was made by Dan Donovan, an ally of Brophy' s (and 
brother-in-law to William’s son, Powers Hapgood) and member 
of the sales department, not to accept Hapgood' s resignation. 
Although Donovan's motion was passed unanimously, the 
major issue appeared unresolved, according to Norman 
Hapgood. Before William P. was invited back to the meeting, 
Norman gave a long speech in which "he made an effort to 
explain the meaning of the vote" regarding publicity on the 
previous Wednesday. He contrasted the goals and purposes of 
the "old guard or the builders" of the company with the "new 
group" of "hot-air artists whose platform is to fight, organize and 
speak." Norman declared that a choice must be made between 
William P. and "a small group of socialists and trade unionists."  
He further suggested that Council consider releasing two people 
in order to remove the major obstacle to harmony and to "make it 
possible (for the business) to go on." Norman put this in the form 
of a motion and asked that Council vote for "either Hapgood or 
Brophy-Tearney." Norman's motion was attacked by several 
members of the sales group. Out of a sense of solidarity with the 
two leaders, nine more individuals voluntarily added their names 
to the list along with Brophy and Tearney.  However, before the 
motion was called for a vote, Norman left the meeting and 
returned with his brother. Speaking upon his return to the 
meeting, William P. offered to remain in his position as sales 
manager if Council would set aside its motion from two days 
earlier regarding publicity funds, which Council agreed to do. 
Hapgood also demanded that "trade-union political tactics" being 
used by some in the plant be stopped, as well as the personal, 
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ad hominem, attacks on him by Brophy.  Brophy responded by 
accusing Hapgood of harboring a "Messianic complex," and of 
failing in practice to live up the ideals of democracy about which 
he had been preaching for so many years.
48
 
 What had begun ostensibly as a disagreement over 
advertising policy had escalated into a showdown between two 
factions for control of the company. On the one hand, there were 
the trade unionists and others within the sales department led by 
Brophy. On the other, there were the administrative staff and 
department heads, officers, and other long-time members of the 
organization, including William H. Hapgood. Obviously, such 
social and political conflict could not have come at a less 
opportune time for Columbia, given the on-going economic crisis 
which gave no sign of relief.  Indeed, the financial report 
presented to Council on January 20, 1933, showed there had 
been a loss of $62, 000 over the previous six months and a loss 
of $12, 000 over the most recent two months alone. It was noted 
that the company probably had fifty more employees on the 
payroll than it could afford. Clearly, by adding more problems to 
its already pressing financial agenda, Columbia risked 
disintegration, bankruptcy, and receivership. No doubt the 
seriousness of the economic situation weighed heavily on the 
minds of the Hapgood faction as it considered its options for 
what, in its view, amounted to saving the business from certain 
ruin. 
 The Council meeting of Monday, January 30, 1933, lasting 
from 6:00 P.M. to 9:45 P.M., was without doubt the most 
controversial, ferocious and bitter assembly of workers ever held 
at Columbia. A few days earlier, Frank Eustis had decried the 
fact that too much power was concentrated in the hands of 
William P. Hapgood and a few others in the company, a situation 
that he claimed undermined "real industrial democracy" at 
Columbia. Accordingly, Eustis had made an unprecedented 
proposal to invest a substantial sum of money in the company if 
there was a re-election of all leaders within the plant under the 
authority of Council (virtually all managerial and administrative 
staff with the exception of the Board of Directors). No decision 
had been made on this proposal at the time it was presented, 
although there had been much heated discussion. It was the 
major item of business on January 30th when, after further 
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acrimonious debate and a call for a secret ballot, a motion to 
reject Eustis's proposal was defeated 57 to 43. 
 Just before the vote on Eustis's motion, William P. Hapgood 
revealed to Council that there had been efforts to arrive at a 
compromise prior to the meeting. These efforts involved his son, 
Powers Hapgood, who had close ties to members of the trade 
union faction and who had been recently recuperating at home 
due to an accident.
49 
 They also involved Brophy, Donovan and 
Tearney of the sales group. Hapgood's plan involved withdrawal 
of Eustis's motion and a sixty day truce. Hapgood observed with 
respect to his compromise plan that an "olive branch has been 
extended and it had been rejected" by the Brophy faction. 
William P. reported, further, that the Board of Directors had 
recently learned that it had the legal authority and obligation to 
direct the business. Specifically, he noted that the Directors 
could, individually, be held "criminally liable" for acts or 
omissions which led to destruction of the business. Accordingly, 
while the ballots on the Eustis motion were still being counted, 
William P. informed Council that the Board of Directors had met 
prior to the current meeting and, by a vote of 4 to 1, had 
empowered him, as President, to discharge Brophy, Donovan 
and Tearney immediately. This revelation stunned many of those 
present, since Council had assumed in theory and practice for 
years that it, not the Board, was in charge of such matters. After 
bitter personal remarks and heated exchanges between various 
persons, a motion was made to disapprove of the Board's action. 
It passed by a vote of 44 to 20, with 17 abstentions. 
Perhaps in part because of the Council's vote of disapproval of 
the Board's action, and perhaps in part because many still hoped 
for a more just resolution of issues "without bloodshed," efforts 
were made over the next few days to arrive at a more desirable 
way out of the present situation. A pivotal role in this regard 
appears to have been played by Powers Hapgood, who had 
strong personal, family and ideological ties to both parties in the 
conflict.
50   
The conflict between his father and wife’s relatives 
and his friends was literally tearing Powers apart emotionally. 
 Powers appeared at the Council Meeting of February 3, 
1933, to share his perspective on recent events. He identified 
two main issues which needed to be addressed: (1) should a 
worker be discharged for merely stating his or her opinion in 
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Council? and, (2) has the Board acted properly by its assertion of 
authority over Council? To both of these questions, he replied in 
the negative, siding essentially with the Brophy-Donovan faction. 
At the same time, Powers defended the good intentions of 
William P. with respect to his commitment to democracy. Powers 
explained that he viewed the differences between his father and 
others on industrial democracy as rooted in an honest 
disagreement over where legislative and executive functions 
begin and end. He refuted the suggestion of duplicity against 
William P. and Norman Hapgood made by Frank Eustis' s 
question regarding the ownership of stock held by the brothers' 
wives by observing that "it happened to be true but other such 
statements had not always been true and no attempt had been 
made to give the right impression," noting that "it looked like it 
was simply an attempt to prove that the Hapgood brothers could 
not be trusted." 
 Powers offered two possible proposals for discussion. He 
suggested first the plan he favored, namely, an internal 
committee of five including two members from each faction and 
one impartial person. The committee would discuss the issues 
and report back to Council in two weeks. He also offered a 
second plan suggested by William P., namely, a committee 
composed of outsiders that would likewise study Columbia and 
offer recommendations on various issues. The outside 
committee might include Sherwood Eddy, Jerome Davis, Paul 
Douglas, and James Myers, individuals who were somewhat 
acquainted with the Columbia experiment and well regarded by 
both factions.
51
  The latter proposal was eventually endorsed by 
Council after discussion.   
 It is an open question whether Power's appearance before 
Council and its adoption of this plan was, as Powers had hoped 
it would be, a healing rather than a widening of the breach.
52
  As 
Brophy acknowledged, there had been much discussion on 
several issues and "the breach had been cut deep and wide." 
Nevertheless, a formal agreement between both factions and the 
Committee of Four was reached on February 26, 1933, and it 
was formally approved by Council the next day. The agreement 
was to run until April 1, 1934, and the Committee would make a 
number of recommendations on a number of issues of concern 
by November 1, 1933. During the interim, temporary limits were 
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placed on the authority and responsibilities of both the Board and 
the Council.  Brophy, Donovan and Tearney were reinstated on 
condition that they agree to working for the common good and 
avoiding politics while at work. Future discharges by the Board 
were to be avoided except for cases of gross insubordination.
53
Unfortunately, the agreement with the Committee of Four 
appears in retrospect to have been too little, too late, to bring 
about any meaningful cessation of political strife among the 
principals at Columbia.  As events would show, the breach was, 
indeed, too deep and wide to be repaired. Within just a few 
weeks of signing the agreement, on March 13th, John Brophy 
and Ethlyn Christensen wrote a joint letter to the Committee 
objecting to the limits placed on Council meetings.
54
  Powers
Hapgood, perhaps sensing the futility of his attempt to secure a 
compromise between the factions, offered his letter of 
resignation to Council on March 17, 1933, stating that he no 
longer believed he could "be either happy or useful" at Columbia. 
Frank Eustis, meanwhile, had been engaged in an active 
campaign against both the Board and William P. Hapgood. This 
campaign included meetings with Columbia's major creditor and 
other activities seemingly contrary to the spirit, certainly, if not 
the letter of the February 26th agreement, which he had signed.  
In response William P. wrote a letter of April 3, 1933, to Jerome 
Davis about Frank Eustis's conduct requesting the Committee of 
Four to allow for the release of employees for reasons other than 
insubordination.  The authority to terminate employees for 
inefficiency, subject to review by an independent mediator, was 
granted by the Committee of Four to the Board in a letter to 
William P. of April 11, 1933.
55
  William P. requested Eustis's
resignation in a letter of April 12, 1933.
56
  Ethlyn Christensen and
two others, including the Council chairman, protesting the 
inclusion of inefficiency as a basis for termination and lamenting 
the loss of democracy at Columbia under Hapgood's autocracy, 
tendered their resignations to Council on April 14, 1933. 
Finally, in a letter of April 4, 1933, William P. wrote Jerome 
Davis with another request from the Board to be released 
entirely from the February 26th agreement with the Committee 
since "there is very little possibility of the two groups into which 
we have become divided finding a solution of these troubles by 
discussion and compromise. 
57
  William P. once again advocated
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this position on Monday, May 8th, when he informed Council that 
it was high time for the worker-owners to decide between either 
himself or the Brophy and Donovan faction. The ostensible 
reason for Hapgood's demand was a hearing on the previous 
Saturday involving a hearing by the impartial arbitrator regarding 
the case of Frank Eustis who, refusing to resign, had been 
terminated by the Board. According to Hapgood, the 
administrative staff who had sat through the meeting had 
reported to him that they could not and would not go through 
such a "strain" again.  The three men were asked to leave the 
meeting so that others could freely discuss the situation in their 
absence, but Brophy and Donovan left only after, upon their 
insistence, a vote was held on the will of the majority regarding 
their attendance.
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 After a long discussion in which procedural 
as well as substantive issues were discussed, three motions 
were made and voted upon: First, the motion to accept Hapgood' 
s resignation was defeated unanimously; second, a motion to 
discharge Brophy was passed by a vote of 48 in favor with 14 
opposed and 9 not voting; third, a similar motion to terminate 
Donovan was passed by a vote of 47 in favor with 13 opposed 
and 7 not voting.  
 William P. clearly had the overwhelming support of workers 
and why not?   He and his family had demonstrated by word, 
deed and a sharing with workers of their business investment in 
Columbia their deep commitment to workplace democracy.  The 
matter with Brophy and Donovan was not yet over, however.  A 
Special Council Meeting was held on May 15, 1933, to consider 
a letter from the Committee of Four which disputed Council's 
authority under the agreement of February 26th to discharge an 
employee without review.  Apparently Brophy and Donovan, who 
had long experience in rough and tumble workplace politics, had 
contacted the Committee of Four with their complaint.  The letter 
to Council stated that either Brophy and Donovan were not 
terminated at all or, if so, they were entitled to an impartial review 
of their cases.  
 A motion was made in Council to cancel the agreement and 
to ask for the withdrawal of the committee. The rationale for this 
motion was the right to self-determination by workers-owners: 
the maker of the motion stated that members of the committee 
were unable to help those at Columbia solve their problems 
The Columbia Conserve Company, 1917-1943 (Colburn)  
Journal for the Liberal Arts and Sciences 17(1) 101 
because, on the one hand, they were both too distant and too 
unfamiliar with the details of their situation and, on the other, 
they simply did not have the responsibility to run the business 
which must accompany decision-making.  It passed 58 to 1, with 
3 abstentions. The Committee of Four, when informed by 
Council of its action by telegram, must have been surprised.  
They responded by stating that Columbia workers-owners 
needed their protection. The Committee also protested that 
Council's decision was illegal. After the passage of several 
months and further correspondence between Columbia and the 
Committee of Four, the Committee made good on its threat to 
lodge a "strong public protest and full report," an action which 
brought adverse publicity to Columbia.  Public airing of the 
matter by the publication of the Committee of Four's report in 
several periodicals, which had previously been positive and 
supportive of the Columbia experiment in workplace democracy, 
created a public relations disaster for the company in the months 
following cessation of conflict.
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 As a result, Columbia lost
whatever moral and competitive edge it may have had in the 
marketplace over its competition with respect to its claim to 
social justice in the workplace. In this respect it seems clear that 
the Committee of Four itself became too involved personally and 
failed to accept the fact that an overwhelming majority of workers 
had in a democratic fashion voted in favor of William P. versus 
the Donovan-Brophy faction.  In retrospect, it appears that the 
Committee of Four lost sight of the forest due to its focus on a 
tree or two and not only failed to support workplace democracy 
when it should have done so but then out of spite did all it could 
to harm the company and workers who remained.   
Declining Years: 1934-1943 
The combination of economic depression and internal 
conflict had taken a considerable toll on the material and mental 
resources of the company. With respect to the financial condition 
of the company, Columbia had sales of $626,191 but a loss of 
$87,754 during the fiscal year ending June, 30, 1933. A very 
modest profit was made for several years afterwards, reaching a 
high of $46,648 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937.  
However, losses again occurred over the next several years until 
a profit of about $56,000 was earned in 1942. This was 
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immediately followed by a loss of a little under $20,000 in 1943.
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As Hapgood noted in a letter of November 27, 1939, to Mr. 
Treadwell Cleveland of Allerton, Massachusetts, sales continued 
to be the major business problem for Columbia during this 
period, as it had been earlier: 
The outstanding material problem is sales. I think I did fairly 
effective work up to 1931 but since that time I have not been 
able to accomplish the sales results which are necessary if 
we are to return to the rate of earnings we secured prior to 
1931. I know our chief problem but not how to solve it. It is to 
show our customers how to put up a successful battle 
against both Campbell and Heinz and particularly Campbell. 
That problem is what I call sales promotion. The national 
advertisers accomplish it by large scale and skillful 
advertising. That method is closed to us on account of the 
multiplicity of labels under which we pack our products. 
Workers-owners at Columbia continued throughout this 
period to be paid a portion of the 1930 base rates of $22 per 
week for a single person, $33 per week for a married man/head 
of household, with $2 additional for each child up to a maximum 
of three children, as follows: 
 Fiscal year ending June 30,  
1932 67.8% 
1933 33% 
1934 54.8% 
1935 66.8% 
1936 68.8% 
1937 72% 
1938 80% 
1939 73.4% 
1940 60% 
On an annual basis in 1937-38, a single person earned $1094, a 
married man with one child $1638, at Columbia.
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 This salary
figure does not include the value of additional benefits such as 
health care, lunches, and life insurance contributions, which 
amounted to an extra $3.50 minimum per employee per week. In 
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comparison, the Morgan Packing Company at Austin, Indiana, 
would have paid their employees about $650 per year, and the 
Stokely Brothers plant in Indianapolis a little more than Morgan, 
had such workers been employed the whole year, which typically 
was not the case in the highly seasonal canning industry.
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 Understandably, in light of the earlier conflict, workers-
owners appeared somewhat reluctant after May, 1933, to 
become involved in Council meetings and activities.  Still, an 
exasperated William P. Hapgood called a special meeting of 
owner-employees at the end of 1933 in which he admonished 
them about their apparent lack of responsibility with respect to 
running the business. He advocated a return to the frequency 
and the responsibility of Council meetings and activities of the 
past, Those present agreed to do so, by a vote of 42 in favor, 
none opposed, and 7 abstentions, with the explicit understanding 
that Council action and decision-making would be subject to the 
Board of Directors. 
 An overview of Columbia's social program was presented for 
discussion purposes at a Council meeting of January 21, 1935, 
in which policies such as guaranteed employment, payment 
based on needs, health care, pensions, and life insurance were 
summarized and reviewed. At two Council meetings on March 6 
and 8, 1935, several guest representatives from the Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin spoke at length to Council about their 
own form of communal government and land ownership, As a 
result of these and other discussions held on these matters held 
over many months, Council made various changes in Columbia's 
social program. Tuition reimbursement for education was 
broadened to include instructional classes or courses of even 
indirect benefit to the company. Dependents were included once 
again in the free health care plan. Pensions were changed from 
being based on individual need to 50 per cent of the individual's 
salary at retirement. A voluntary group life insurance plan, for 
which the company paid 50 per cent of the cost, became 
obligatory with a rule that required every person to purchase at 
least $1000 of life insurance at a cost of $8.50 to the employee. 
And during early 1935, the prevailing need-based method of 
salary and wage compensation at Columbia was thoroughly 
reviewed and discussed. The Special Income Adjustment 
Committee was established to recommend salary adjustments 
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based on the responsibility of the position. However, after much 
discussion on the committee' s recommendations, no changes in 
the salary system were made. 
 Perhaps the most interesting and notable of Council's 
activities during this period was union interest and activity. 
William P. had reported at a Council meeting of June 1, 1937, 
that he had received a request for food donations from a C.I.O. 
leader who was leading a strike against the Morgan Canning 
Company of Austin, Indiana. Hapgood offered his view that 
Columbia should unionize, leading to a candid discussion of 
union issues and an invitation to a field representative of the 
newly formed C.I.0. Canners' Union to speak at a future Council 
meeting. Some voiced support for a union if it did not mean 
jeopardizing the social program, while others recalled the trouble 
with trade unionists a few years earlier. Partly at John Brophy's 
suggestion, Donald Henderson, President of the Canning Union, 
sent an invitation to through the Indiana C.I.O. organizer for 
Columbia to send representatives to a convention in Denver for 
the unionization of the canning industry. William P. Hapgood 
attended the convention on July 9, 1937, along with one other 
Columbia salaried employee and two wage workers.
63
  The 
resulting report to Council was generally favorable, though it was 
not until April, 1938, shortly after Donald Henderson personally 
visited Columbia, that the company elected to establish a C.I.O. 
affiliate local of the United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and 
Allied Workers of America. By April 18, 1938, 59 out of the 68 
salaried employees had joined the union and on January 13, 
1939, Council voted to make union membership made 
mandatory, making Columbia a closed shop. However, this 
requirement was abolished about a year later and, by late 
summer, 1940, the union came to an end due to a lack of 
interest on the part of workers. 
 Given the operating losses sustained by Columbia during 
much of this period, the company had been unable to pay any 
dividends on common or preferred stock since 1931. As a result, 
capital impairment to Columbia in June, 1940, was in the amount 
of $201,000 due to accumulated unpaid dividends and debts 
owed to the major creditor, the Continental Can Company. Since 
there was a total of $211,000 of common stock on the books, the 
value of the common stock at this time was essentially nil. 
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Accordingly, the Board arrived at a two-step plan in early 1940 to 
eliminate this financial impairment through a legal reorganization 
of the company. First, in order to facilitate reorganization 
proceedings in court, cancellation of the 1926 agreement 
between the Hapgoods and employees regarding the purchase 
of common stock was agreed to at a Council Meeting of April 19, 
1940. It was explained that since employees already owned 63 
per cent of common stock, they were the voting majority and 
they stood to gain nothing by the purchase of remaining stock. 
Second, a proposal was announced at the Annual Meeting of 
July 19, 1940 to reduce the amount of common stock issued by 
95 per cent (the amount it was impaired) and to distribute the 
remaining 5 per cent on a pro rata basis. Although this stock 
reduction plan was accepted by those stockholders present by a 
vote of 47 to 0, it was later blocked by one stockholder and 
former employee, Frank Eustis. As a result of this one person's 
refusal, Columbia was unable to reorganize and eliminate its 
capital impairment until May 1944. 
 By mid-1942, Council meetings had become so rare that the 
question was asked at a Council meeting of July 24th whether it 
was even necessary to elect officers for the new year. At the 
July, 1942, Annual Meeting of Stockholders considerable 
dissatisfaction with current salary levels, in view of the rising cost 
of living, was expressed by several workers-owners. Hapgood 
responded by pointing out that it was not advisable to raise 
salaries in light of the large deficit, even though the company had 
posted its first profit ($56,000) in five years, since the future 
outlook was still uncertain. No action was taken by the Board or 
Council to raise salaries.  The salary issue was apparently 
important to many workers-owners, insofar as the Board's 
apparent unwillingness to grant a raise appears to have served 
as the catalyst for the formation of an A.F.L. local at Columbia in 
the late summer of 1942. The new union's major demand, 
presented on August 14, 1942, was a raise for all workers. At the 
time, Columbia was paying $17 per week for a single woman, 
$23.50 for a single man, and $24.50 for a head of household 
with one child. The union was demanding a minimum of $22 per 
week for women and $30 per week for men. The Board agreed 
to raise wages for hourly workers from between 2.5 to 7.5 cents 
an hour, depending on classification. It was willing to allow any 
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salaried employee to switch to an hourly status and receive 
hourly wages. But it steadfastly refused to grant any monetary 
increase to salaried employees so long as they remained on 
salary (and enjoyed such benefits as permanent employment). 
Hapgood expressed his consternation at the workers-owners’ 
demands:  “ I have been disappointed that very few of our salary 
workers have understood their responsibility in a partnership. 
That they have not taken this responsibility is clear, and that they 
will not take it is just as clear, because of the proposal they 
make...”
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 At a Board meeting of August 24, 1942, attended by a 
Conciliator from the U.S. Department of Labor, the decision was 
made that the trust fund holding the collective stock of the 
workers-owners should be dissolved and the common stock 
distributed to individual employees. Accordingly, at the last 
recorded meeting of Council held on August 24, 1942, the 
position of the Board was reported and a motion to dissolve the 
trust was put on the floor for a vote, It was explained that the 
Board had met all of the union's demands with the exception of 
increasing the salaries of salaried employees. Hugh Gormley, 
the Indianapolis representative of the A.F.L., attended the 
meeting and endorsed the Board's proposal. During the 
discussion some workers-owners expressed concern about 
whether workers would still exercise control over the company 
subsequent to the dissolution of the trust. As Hapgood 
explained, they could in fact still maintain such control if they 
cooperated in voting their individual stock for Board members of 
their choice. Nevertheless, the motion was defeated by a two-to-
one vote of 14 for and 28 against. 
 Although talks were scheduled between Columbia and union 
representatives on September 3rd, a strike occurred before that 
time on September 1, 1942, when all but 24 of 241 workers 
walked off the job. Both sides agreed to turn the case over to the 
National War Labor Board for arbitration, and the job action 
officially ended on September 6, 1942. The case was finally 
resolved on May 5, 1943, in a decision favorable to the Board.
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As a result, it was agreed that all production employees, with the 
exception of those with supervisory responsibilities, had to join 
the union within ten days of employment with the company. 
Workers were to be paid on the wage scale the Board had 
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proposed prior to the strike, a maximum of $.625 for men and 
$.525 for women after 40 days of employment, and they would 
receive time-and-a-half for work over 40 hours. 
Several months after the strike had occurred, on December 
30, 1942, a majority of the remaining salaried employees filed 
suit for receivership, alleging gross mismanagement and several 
other charges against the Board and the Officers of Columbia. A 
trial was held several weeks later in January, 1943, in Marion 
County Superior Court, the outcome of which was that the judge 
denied the petition of the plaintiffs for a receiver. On February 
15, 1943, the Trustees, who held the common stock that 
workers-owners purchased collectively under the agreement of 
1926, filed a counter-suit to dissolve the trust. A hearing was 
held in May, 1943, and Judge Hezzie B. Pike handed down his 
decision, favorable to the company and the Trustees, on July 3, 
1943. The judge re-affirmed his earlier finding that the company 
had not been mismanaged. Specifically, he determined that the 
business was not liable to present or former employees for any 
claim of back pay or deferred salary. The judge further found that 
the "said trust was terminated as of December 31, 1942." As a 
result, he decreed that "there is no right now available to any 
common stockholder to convert common stock... to preferred 
stock." He also noted that the pension plan which was part of the 
1926 agreement had been "discontinued and abandoned by the 
consent of those interested" and that the company had no 
liability for it. Judge Pike also defined a procedure by which the 
1,315 shares of common stock held collectively in trust would be 
distributed to individual employees by December 31, 1943. It 
was based on the number of months the employee worked 
between January 21, 1925 and December 31, 1942, as a portion 
of the total sum of such months worked by all salaried 
employees during this time period. 
With the conclusion of the suit and the dissolution of the 
trust, the longest chapter of workplace democracy attempted by 
a business anywhere came to an abrupt, somewhat inglorious 
end. Columbia henceforth operated as any other capitalist 
enterprise did. As reported in Business Week (July 31, 1943), 
the legal resolution of the case represented the end of a dream 
of workplace democracy.  Columbia' s financial situation 
improved a good deal after the end of World War Two. The 
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company largely became a profitable concern following the war 
years and it continued in the business of making soup, if not the 
production of justice, until it was sold in 1953 to John Sexton and 
Company for a sum of about $500,000. All in all, a total of 
$178,161 was paid to preferred stockholders, and $489,012 to 
common stockholders, upon conclusion of that sale. 
 
Conclusion  
 In contrast to some writers (Vance, 1956) of the Columbia 
experience who have labeled it an "unsuccessful experiment in 
industrial democracy,"  I am more inclined to regard the 
Columbia experience along the same lines as does McQuaid 
(1976, pp. 510-511), namely, as "one of the most-successful 
attempts yet made to create a viable version of that cooperative 
industrial commonwealth which had inspired labor leaders, 
churchmen, and reformers of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.
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  In this respect, I believe the Columbia 
experience provides the student of industrial organization in 
general, and of workplace democracy in particular, with a most 
remarkable and unique opportunity to understand the challenges 
and constraints that must be faced by any person or group that 
would seek to actualize justice in the workplace.  
 What lessons are to be drawn from this interesting 
experiment in workplace democracy?  I would like to respond to 
this question with a focus on two areas of interest: (1) Council 
structure and operation, and (2) the 1926 contract involving the 
new profit-sharing plan to acquire collective ownership by 
workers-owners of the company.  
 One major limitation of workplace democracy at Columbia 
had to do with the organization of Council, which reflected the 
strengths and weaknesses of the "town hall" approach to 
democracy with its direct representation by, and participation of, 
each individual member of the community on every single issue 
or matter that comes before it. Given Columbia's preference for 
such direct and total democracy, there was a tendency to create 
a system that was inclusive rather than exclusive of communal 
members, that is, one that enabled or maximized the 
participation by members of the community at Council meetings. 
Council operated, for the most part, on the basis of custom with 
few formal rules and with no written constitution or by-laws. 
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There were few requirements for membership to Council, and 
there were virtually no limits -- until 1933, when Council was 
reigned in by the Board of Directors -- on the authority and 
responsibilities of Council itself. There is no question that the 
combination of informality and absolute power of Council at 
times encouraged discussion and the expression of viewpoints 
among workers, as well as resulted in much innovation and 
experimentation, but it also tended to result in much micro-
management and the failure to distinguish between operational 
and policy issues -- or what Powers Hapgood in 1933 referred to 
as the difference between executive and legislative power. 
 If Council had had a more clearly defined limit to its authority 
-- for example, Council had the authority to determine broad 
policies but not to directly supervise day-to-day operations, or to 
appoint department heads, but not the authority to attempt to 
manage such departments -- then the sales staff could not have 
tried in 1932-1933 to politicize their differences with their 
department head, William P., over publicity and advertising 
policy in Council, as they in fact did.  In effect, the sales group 
was able to prevail upon Council to attempt to micro-manage the 
sales department as the sales staff saw fit on the issue of 
publicity.  Such decisions ought to have been left to department 
heads or the professionals or “technicians” with the knowledge 
and expertise to effectively get the job done.  Hapgood had 
undoubtedly been right on the issue of promoting the Columbia 
label, over the resistance of his staff, and he may well have been 
right on the need for even more marketing and “publicity” for it. 
As department head, he ought to have been relied upon to make 
such a call, at least until proven wrong, and not second-guessed 
by a Council which lacked the technical expertise to do so. Only 
if Council lost confidence with a department's leadership as a 
whole, should it act, and then its action should have been limited 
to appointing a new leader. As it was, Council had no such 
limitations to its authority. 
 And the responsibility for this latter structural and operational 
error in fact and perception resides with the failure of the owners, 
including William P., to have fully recognized the legal and 
practical problems associated with such total empowerment of 
Council.  In the end, Columbia operated within the legal 
framework of incorporation that dictated the Board of Directors 
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was the final authority for all business decisions of the company.  
It is difficult to know with any certainty, but what if Council had 
been structured at the outset with a more realistic and limited 
sense of its scope and authority as enshrined in a set of by-laws, 
for example?  William P.’s missionary-like zeal for direct, total 
democracy would not be tempered until many years later when it 
much too late to reconsider. 
 Nor was enough consideration given in establishing direct 
democracy at Columbia to the classic problem of demagoguery 
excess faced by all democracies, but especially direct 
democracies, beginning with ancient Athens. Emotional appeals 
and rhetorical excesses which cloud or circumvent reason are an 
inevitable part of the freedom of speech of democracy, but some 
consideration or safeguard needs to be given to prevent action 
or decision-making from being made in the "heat of passion." 
While such a concern may not have been present in the early 
days at Columbia when the goal was simply encouraging self-
expression in Council meetings, it potentially became more of a 
problem as more self-confident and eloquent speakers joined 
Columbia. Without a way to limit debate and rhetorical excess, 
Council became an open battleground for war between the two 
factions in 1932-33. It did not help that the assembly immediately 
voted on proposals without some time for reflection on decisions.  
 Secondly, it seems clear that there was a fundamental flaw 
in the approach to worker ownership of Columbia envisioned in 
the 1926 contract. The basic problem is that the procedure was 
both an abstraction and a fiction: the purchase of common stock 
by workers, held in the collective trust, was essentially a gift from 
the Hapgood family who were the original capital owners (and 
there was no doubt resentment some felt about the owners' s 
generosity) since it was only through their willingness to share 
profits in this way that made the purchase of a majority of 
common stock possible.  Since the worker never "owned" or 
possessed the profit to begin with, it was no decision or sacrifice 
on the part of the worker to use such funds to buy company 
stock. Insofar as the transaction was more or less an abstract 
fiction to account for the transfer of ownership from owners to 
workers, it did not represent a meaningful commitment on the 
part of the individual worker to assume the duty and 
responsibilities of ownership -- a criticism frequently leveled at 
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workers by William P. Hapgood.  As result, concern over wages 
paid more honestly and directly reflected the Columbia worker's 
interest than owner's concerns. 
It is worth noting that Columbia workers were still earning 
well above the national average wage of $12.50 in the canning 
industry in the early 1930s, even with reduced and occasional 
skipped paychecks (as they were a decade later in 1942 when 
they went out on strike).
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  In addition, no workers at Columbia
were ever threatened with layoff due to the economic situation, 
while unemployment in the canning industry was at an all-time 
high of over 11 %.  And Columbia workers continued to enjoy 
various health and other benefits that most workers elsewhere 
could only dream of.  Objectively, in terms of absolute 
deprivation, workers at Columbia were doing quite well even in 
the midst of a depression and later recessions; yet, in terms of 
relative deprivation and self-perception, workers at Columbia 
appeared to underestimate their good fortune and situation. 
Obviously, whatever ownership of Columbia meant to workers, 
many of them took it to mean the right to enjoy direct economic 
benefit, and this message was not heard by those who had the 
power to distribute such resources. 
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